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Both seasonal and pandemic influenza continue to challenge both scientists and clinicians. Drug-
resistant H1N1 influenza viruses have dominated the 2009 flu season, and the H5N1 avian influenza 
virus continues to kill both people and poultry in Eurasia. Here, we discuss the pathogenesis and 
transmissibility of influenza viruses and we emphasize the need to find better predictors of both 
seasonal and potentially pandemic influenza.Introduction
Influenza is historically an ancient disease that causes annual 
epidemics and, at irregular intervals, pandemics. Seasonal 
influenza kills 36,000 persons annually in the United States. 
The impact of seasonal influenza caused by a virus showing 
antigenic variation in the major viral glycoproteins hemaggluti-
nin (H) and neuraminidase (N) can be moderated by antigeni-
cally matched vaccines and anti-influenza drugs. The conse-
quences of continuing genetic variation in seasonal influenza 
viruses are apparent in the current and prior influenza seasons. 
Despite intensive global surveillance, the H3N2 vaccine in the 
2007–2008 season imperfectly matched the virus that emerged 
between vaccine selection and its use (6 months). In the current 
influenza season, the H1N1 virus that has become dominant is 
resistant to the anti-influenza drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu).
Pandemics that occur at irregular intervals can vary in sever-
ity from mild to catastrophic. The pandemics of the past century 
include the catastrophic H1N1 Spanish influenza of 1918 (more 
than 50 million deaths globally), the H2N2 Asian flu of 1957 (more 
than 1 million deaths globally), and the H3N2 Hong Kong flu of 
1968 (~0.5 million deaths globally). The natural reservoirs of these 
influenza A viruses are aquatic birds, and the spread of influenza 
to humans occurs either by direct transmission (Spanish influ-
enza) or by reassortment between the segmented RNA genomes 
of avian and human influenza viruses (the Asian and Hong Kong 
pandemics). Although we know the general mechanisms by 
which new influenza viruses emerge, our basic knowledge of how 
these viruses acquire human pandemic potential is minimal, and 
our molecular understanding of the virus and the host factors 
involved in successful transmission and spread is rudimentary.
A highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus has been cir-
culating for more than a decade in Eurasia and has spread to 
more than 60 countries. It has infected 394 humans killing 248, 
with recent deaths reported in China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and 
Egypt. The occasional direct transmission of the virus to humans 
and its lethality suggest the possibility of a pandemic akin to the 
1918 Spanish flu if consistent human-to-human transmission is 
achieved. We argue that it is premature to become complacent, 
and we identify research directions in influenza virus ecology 
and the molecular biology of pathogenesis and transmission that 
should enable the development of better predictors of seasonal 
and pandemic influenza and increased preparedness (Figure 1).402 Cell 136, February 6, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc.Reservoirs and Surveillance
The 16 hemagglutinin and 9 neuraminidase subtypes of influ-
enza A virus are perpetuated in aquatic birds, in which they 
cause no apparent disease (Peiris et al., 2007). Only viruses 
of the H5 and H7 hemagglutinin subtypes can become highly 
pathogenic after transmission to alternative hosts. Each of the 
H5 and H7 lineages that are lethal to domestic poultry origi-
nated from nonpathogenic precursor viruses of Eurasian and 
American lineages (Alexander, 2007). However, until 1996, 
highly pathogenic H5 and H7 viruses either were eradicated 
or failed to persist in nature. Today, it is unknown whether 
the ecology of these viruses has changed and whether highly 
pathogenic H5N1 viruses continue to be propagated in domes-
tic or wild bird reservoirs. The continued circulation of Asian 
H5N1 viruses of multiple clades (at least 10 different clades) 
and subclades is unprecedented.
The available evidence suggests that all of the pandemic 
influenza virus strains, including the Spanish 1918 (H1N1), 
Asian 1957 (H2N2), and Hong Kong 1968 (H3N2) viruses, origi-
nated from the avian influenza reservoir either by reassortment 
(swapping of viral genetic information in hosts coinfected with 
more than one influenza virus) or direct transfer (Kobasa et 
al., 2004). Influenza outbreaks in domestic animals, including 
poultry, also originate from the avian reservoir. Our knowledge 
of the precursors of pandemic and panzootic influenza viruses 
is extremely limited. The available information indicates that 
viruses in their natural reservoirs undergo limited evolution, 
replicate primarily in the intestinal and respiratory tracts, and 
change their predominant subtypes every 2 years (Fouchier et 
al., 2003). Knowledge of the genomics of influenza viruses in 
this natural reservoir is fragmentary, and evidence suggests 
that there is continuing reassortment in nature (Dugan et al., 
2008; Obenauer et al., 2006).
Analysis of the multiple lineages of highly pathogenic H5N1 
viruses supports the contention that all of them arose in 
Southeast Asia (Kilpatrick et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006). For 
example, the H5N1 virus that emerged at Qinghai Lake, China 
spread (probably in wild birds) to Europe, Africa, and India (Li 
et al., 2004). Similarly, the lineage that spread to Indonesia can 
be traced to China’s Hunan Province (Wang et al., 2008). The 
domestic duck may be the “Trojan horse” of the H5N1 viruses, 
for many ducks show no signs of disease yet shed virus for up 
Figure 1. Spheres of Progress in Influenza Research
Shown are the three major areas of influenza research: (1) the molecular basis of pathogenicity and transmission, (2) surveillance, and (3) therapies and pan-
demic preparedness. Points of overlap among the three circles illustrate how the findings in each area have implications for the other two areas. The major 
challenges within each area of research are noted around the periphery of that circle.to 17 days after infection and propagate influenza virus anti-
genic variants with low pathogenicity (Hulse et al., 2005). This 
hypothesis will be resolved only by detailed molecular epide-
miological studies.
To date, there is no influenza surveillance system in lower 
animals and birds that is comparable to the well-organized, 
interactive Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) for 
human influenza. The pandemic threat of H5N1 influenza has 
resulted in closer collaborations between international agri-
cultural and human health organizations. However, the lack 
of a counterpart of GISN at the human-animal interface is 
a serious shortfall in pandemic preparedness. A genomic 
library of all subtypes of influenza viruses in wild and 
domestic birds, continuously updated by high-throughput 
sequencing and analysis, is badly needed to identify predic-
tors of pandemics.
Host Range and Transmission
Influenza viruses probably undergo genetic changes to spread 
from the wild bird reservoir to other hosts. Such changes are 
facilitated when multiple species of birds and mammals are 
housed in close proximity in live animal markets (Webster, 
2004). It is unclear whether influenza viruses are transmitted 
directly from natural reservoirs to mammals, including humans. 
Notably, chickens are not susceptible to most of the low-patho-
genicity subtypes, including nonpathogenic H5 and H7 strains, without adaptation (Swayne, 2007). The involvement of inter-
mediate hosts, including the quail and the pig, has been sug-
gested (Matrosovich et al., 1999), but there is no smoking gun. 
A suggested transmission scenario might follow this sequence: 
wild waterfowl → domestic waterfowl → quail/pig → chicken → 
human. All of these birds and some mammals are found in vari-
ous live markets. Information about the molecular profiles that 
permit transmission between these species is emerging (Perez 
et al., 2003), but there is much still to learn. Expansion of the 
host range of the Asian H5N1 avian influenza virus to felines, 
viverrids, stone martens, and dogs has been associated with 
high pathogenicity and systemic spread (Rimmelzwaan et al., 
2006; Songserm et al., 2006). Extension of the host range to 
felid species remains to be elucidated at the molecular level; 
if domestic cats can serve as intermediate hosts, their infec-
tion would promote the selection of variants transmissible to 
humans.
The pig may be an intermediate host for interspecies spread; 
the replication of all avian viruses in pigs supports this notion, 
as does the presence of avian-type and mammalian-type virus 
receptors in pigs (Ludwig et al., 1995). The periodic transmis-
sion of avian influenza viruses to pigs in the absence of dis-
ease and the spread of human H1N1 and H3N2 viruses to pigs 
(Ma et al., 2007) are also consistent with the “mixing-vessel” 
hypothesis, but to date the pig has not been directly implicated 
in the generation of pandemic influenza viruses.Cell 136, February 6, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc. 403
Viral Factors in Pathogenesis and Transmission
Receptor Specificity
A major enigma of influenza virus is whether alteration of 
viral specificity for host cell receptors (sialic acids) can gen-
erate a pandemic strain of virus. The viral hemagglutinin sur-
face glycoprotein preferentially binds to certain sialic acid 
residues on host cells, making hemagglutinin a determinant 
of host range. Specific amino acid changes in hemaggluti-
nin have been identified as important in sialic acid receptor 
specificity and pathogenicity (Matrosovich et al., 1999; Ste-
vens et al., 2006b; Yamada et al., 2006). The hemagglutinin of 
human influenza virus isolates typically binds preferentially 
to α2,6-linked sialic acids, whereas that of avian influenza 
virus isolates has a higher affinity for α2,3-linked sialic acids 
(Ito, 2000). Interestingly, sialic acid receptors are distributed 
differently in the respiratory tracts of humans and other host 
species (Matrosovich et al., 2004; Shinya et al., 2006; van 
Riel et al., 2007). The human and ferret upper respiratory 
tract, believed to be the primary site of influenza infection, 
carries primarily α2,6-linked sialic acids, which gives human 
viral isolates a binding advantage. Receptor specificity must 
be studied at the level of the cell type to discern the relative 
susceptibility of cells to infection on the basis of sialic acid 
expression. This information will be of particular interest, 
as some H5N1 viruses cause systemic infection, including 
infection of brain cells.
Notably, the 1918, 1957, and 1968 
pandemic strains all preferentially bind 
to α2,6-linked sialic acids (Stevens et 
al., 2006a), and so preferential affinity 
for these receptors may be necessary 
for emergence of a pandemic strain car-
rying an avian-derived hemagglutinin 
gene. However, avian isolates that bind 
preferentially to α2,3-linked sialic acids 
are lethal in humans and mammals and 
replicate well in the upper respiratory 
tract. Thus, it remains an open ques-
tion whether H5N1 viruses must acquire 
specificity for binding to α2,6-linked 
sialic acids to become pandemic. Inter-
estingly, cultured human respiratory epi-
thelial cells lacking α2,3-linked sialic acids could be infected 
ex vivo with H5N1 viruses (Nicholls et al., 2007). This finding 
together with advances in glycan array technology (Stevens et 
al., 2006a) suggest that receptor specificity may involve fac-
tors other than binding to α2,3-linked and α2,6-linked sialic 
acids. However, the biological relevance of receptor binding 
particularly for viral entry, replication, spread, tissue tropism, 
and transmission still needs to be determined.
Replication Efficiency
What other viral factors increase the virulence or transmis-
sion of influenza virus, and by what mechanism? Certain H5N1 
viruses with a hemagglutinin that preferentially binds to α2,3-
linked sialic acids replicate in humans and can be lethal, sug-
gesting that genes other than that encoding hemagglutinin are 
crucial for virulence. The replication efficiency of influenza virus 
correlates with its virulence. Specific amino acid sequences 
encoded by the polymerase genes alone are sufficient to make 
a virus lethal in animal models (Gabriel et al., 2005; Hatta et 
al., 2001; Salomon et al., 2006). The best-described marker of 
pathogenicity is lysine at position 627 of polymerase subunit 
protein PB2 (Hatta et al., 2001; Subbarao et al., 1993). This resi-
due enhances the growth efficiency of avian H5N1 viruses in 
the upper and lower respiratory tracts of mice. As the impor-
tance of specific polymerase residues to lethality is identified, 
it will be crucial to elucidate the mechanism by which these 
residues affect replication efficiency. Each of the eight neg-
Figure 2. Molecular Basis of Influenza 
Pathogenesis
The life cycle of the influenza virus begins with 
binding of the virus to sialic acid receptors on the 
surface of the host cell via the viral surface gly-
coprotein hemagglutinin (H). This step contributes 
to pathogenesis, transmission, and host range re-
striction. Replication of the eight negative-strand 
RNA segments that comprise the influenza ge-
nome is central to viral pathogenesis and could be 
a potential therapeutic target. The release of the 
virion from the host cell is a hallmark of success-
ful completion of the influenza virus life cycle. Key 
molecular proteins and pathways that are activat-
ed during influenza virus infection of the host cell 
are also depicted. Potential host signal transduc-
tion factors are indicated in red.404 Cell 136, February 6, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc.
ative-sense RNA segments of influenza virus is transcribed 
into mRNA by the viral ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex com-
prised of the PB2, PB1, PA, and NP proteins (Figure 2). Crystal 
structures of portions of the RNP complex have already shed 
light on how these proteins work (He et al., 2008; Noda et al., 
2006). However, more biochemical research into the structure 
of the complex is needed to reveal why certain residues affect 
the interaction of the polymerase proteins, viral RNA, and host 
proteins. Elucidating how receptor specificity and polymerase-
driven replication affect the pathogenicity and transmission of 
H5N1 viruses will yield important clues about host adaptation, 
pandemic potential, and the development of antiviral drugs.
Transmissibility
What are the requirements for human-to-human transmission 
of a potentially pandemic highly pathogenic avian influenza 
virus, and what mechanisms are involved? The absence of effi-
cient human-to-human transmission of H5N1 viruses to date 
may explain why the circulating avian influenza virus has not 
caused a pandemic. Ferrets, which are naturally susceptible 
to influenza, have been used as a model to investigate trans-
mission of H5N1 viruses. In both humans and ferrets, respira-
tory epithelial cells express primarily α2,6-linked sialic acids, 
H5N1 viruses bind preferentially to epithelial cells in the lower 
respiratory tract, and infection causes acute respiratory ill-
ness (Matrosovich et al., 2004; Shinya et al., 2006; van Riel 
et al., 2007). Pathogenic H5N1 virus was not transmitted from 
infected to contact ferrets regardless of the α2,3- or α2,6-
linked sialic acid receptor binding affinity (Yen et al., 2007b). 
In another study, acquisition of the surface glycoproteins of 
efficiently transmissible H3N2 human influenza viruses did not 
alter transmission of poorly transmissible H5N1 avian viruses 
(Maines et al., 2006), suggesting that H5N1 transmission 
involves multiple genetic adaptations.
Factors beyond the viral genome may also contribute to 
transmissibility. For example, virus is thought to be transmitted 
in droplets generated by coughing or sneezing. In a guinea pig 
model of human infection, H3N2 influenza virus was indeed 
transmitted via an aerosol, and aerosol transmission was 
enhanced by lower humidity and temperature (Lowen et al., 
2007). These findings shed light on the seasonality of human 
influenza outbreaks. Importantly, however, H3N2 influenza 
virus is transmitted among guinea pigs without coughing and 
sneezing, which is not true in ferrets. If H5N1 viruses do acquire 
efficient human-to-human transmissibility, it will be important 
to understand the full range of factors that can modulate trans-
mission.
Coinfection
The coinfection of a human by a seasonal H3N2 influenza 
virus with efficient transmissibility and an avian H5N1 virus 
with poor transmissibility has the potential to generate a reas-
sortant H5N1 virus with efficient transmission or pandemic 
potential. In a hallmark study, the reassortant viruses gener-
ated from swapping the genes of H5N1 and H3N2 influenza 
viruses did not yield influenza viruses with efficient transmis-
sibility in ferrets (Maines et al., 2006). Nevertheless, there is 
still concern about coinfection of humans and the emergence 
of H5N1 viruses with efficient human-to-human transmission. 
Multiple different genotypes of avian H5N1 viruses continue to emerge and the possibility of coinfection of humans with both 
avian H5N1 and seasonal H1N1 or H3N2 influenza virus is a 
continuing possibility. The possibility of genetic reassortment 
between these influenza viruses resulting in an H5N1 virus with 
increased ability to transmit between humans indicates that 
increased surveillance is needed to capture these coinfections 
of H5N1 and other influenza viruses and to elucidate which 
genetic reassortments will result in an influenza virus with pan-
demic potential.
The contribution to pathogenesis of coinfections with influ-
enza virus and bacteria is another intriguing research area. 
Evidence suggests that a majority of deaths during the 1918 
Spanish flu pandemic were due to secondary bacterial pneu-
monia (McCullers, 2006; Morens et al., 2008). Major knowledge 
gaps exist in our understanding of the complex interactions 
of multiple pathogens with each other and with the coinfected 
host. Thus, research and pandemic preparedness will require a 
focus on secondary bacterial infection and treatment.
Host Factors in Pathogenicity
The Immune Response
The pathology induced by some strains of influenza A virus 
has been correlated with an excessive immune response (de 
Jong et al., 2006). Studies of innate immune cells (dendritic 
cells, monocytes, natural killer cells, and neutrophils) and of 
the CD4, CD8, and B lymphocytes during infection with H5N1 
avian influenza virus are necessary to understand the protec-
tive and pathologic effects of the adaptive immune response 
and to inform the design of vaccines. The fundamental ques-
tions are the tissues in which these immune cells act, the effec-
tor functions they perform, and the requirements and mecha-
nisms that regulate these functions.
The rapid accumulation of proinflammatory cytokines 
(“cytokine storm”) after infection, with either the currently cir-
culating highly pathogenic avian influenza virus or the 1918 
Spanish influenza virus, is thought to play a prominent role in 
morbidity and mortality (Cheung et al., 2002; de Jong et al., 
2006; Kash et al., 2006b). Levels of mRNAs encoding TNFα, 
RANTES (regulated on activation, normal T cell expressed, 
and secreted), MIP1α and 1β (macrophage inflammatory pro-
tein), and CCL2 (monocyte chemotactic protein-1 MCP-1) were 
markedly higher in primary human macrophages infected with 
H5N1 virus than in those infected with human-adapted H3N2 
or H1N1 viruses (Cheung et al., 2002). Similarly, primary human 
bronchial and alveolar epithelial cells secreted significantly 
more IP-10 (interferon-γ-inducible protein-10), IL6 (interleu-
kin-6), and RANTES when infected with H5N1 compared with 
H1N1 influenza virus (Chan et al., 2005). Mice and macaques 
infected with the 1918 pandemic strain of influenza virus 
showed increased expression of proinflammatory cytokine 
mRNAs and proteins (Kash et al., 2006b).
Because a dysregulated cytokine response has been linked 
to the severity of disease caused by some strains of influ-
enza A virus, therapy that blocks the cytokine cascade could 
prove beneficial. Administration of an immunomodulatory 
statin, gemfibrozil, 4–10 days after inoculation with an H2N2 
virus increased survival of mice by 50% (Budd et al., 2007). 
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mice reduced morbidity after inoculation with the H5N1 avian 
influenza virus (Szretter et al., 2007). However, although sur-
vival was prolonged, mortality was not significantly reduced. 
Further, mice that lacked CCL2, IL6, or TNFα succumbed as 
often as wild-type mice to infection with a lethal H5N1 virus 
(Salomon et al., 2007). Interestingly, recent investigations into 
the role of cytokines in ferrets infected with the H5N1 virus 
indicated that treatment with a chemokine receptor inhibitor, 
AMG487, reduced morbidity and modestly delayed mortality 
(Cameron et al., 2008). Together, these results suggest that 
inhibition of a single immune signaling molecule is unlikely to 
improve morbidity or survival following infection with highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus. However, therapies targeting 
an overexuberant immune response may yet prove beneficial. 
A more complete understanding of the cause and effect of the 
cytokine storm may aid in the development of new therapeu-
tics (Table 1).
Other Host Factors
Influenza virus encodes only ten viral proteins but replicates 
successfully in a broad range of avian and mammalian spe-
cies by exploiting host cell functions (Figure 2). The interac-
tions of the virus and host cell proteins are crucial to viral 
replication, assembly, and trafficking (Ludwig et al., 2006). 
Further understanding of the complex signal transduction 
pathways induced by viral and host protein interactions may 
provide new targets for antiviral therapy. The identity of the 
specific host factors involved in resistance and susceptibil-
ity to avian influenza virus can be solved only by the com-
bined efforts of virologists, immunologists, geneticists, and 
biochemists.
We know that type I interferons (IFNα/β) are a crucial innate 
defense against viruses because of their potent antiviral and 
immunoregulatory effects. Mx1 is an antiviral host gene induced 
by IFNα/β, and inbred mouse models of influenza usually lack 
this gene. In two recent studies, these mice were protected 
from infection with lethal human H5N1 virus and from the recon-
structed 1918 pandemic virus by a mechanism that reduces 
polymerase activity and is enhanced by IFNα/β (Tumpey et al., 
2007). Further research into this protective mechanism may 
reveal how it can be exploited therapeutically.
A key component of innate immunity is pattern recognition 
receptors, some of which specifically detect viral components. 
One such receptor, retinoic acid-inducible protein I (RIG-I), 
was recently implicated in the recognition of influenza RNA 
and the activation of antiviral pathways. This protein is crucial 
for production of IFNα/β in response to influenza, and mice 
genetically deficient in RIG-I show increased susceptibility to 
influenza. RIG-I specifically recognizes 5′-phosphorylated viral 
genomic single-stranded RNA. However, the nonstructural 
NS1 protein of influenza virus has multiple functions including 
inhibiting the host immune response by forming a complex with 
RIG-I and blocking the induction of type I interferons (Pichlmair 
et al., 2006). Further investigation of these innate sensors and 
the host cofactors involved in inducing the anti-influenza virus 
response is needed. A point of interest is whether the highly 
lethal H5N1 viruses and other influenza viruses with pandemic 
potential have mechanisms to reduce the effectiveness of 
innate immune sensors.406 Cell 136, February 6, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc.Another host factor inhibited by the NS1 protein of influenza 
A is CPSF30 (cleavage and polyadenylation specificity factor), 
which is required for processing of cellular pre-mRNAs includ-
ing IFNβ mRNA. Recent structural data suggest that drugs 
targeting the interaction of CPSF30 and NS1 may be useful in 
the treatment of influenza (Das et al., 2008). Other interferon-
induced host factors involved in protection against influenza 
viruses include 2′-5′ oligo (A) synthetase and protein kinase 
R. The cellular signal transduction pathways activated during 
infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus need fur-
ther elucidation to reveal the key biochemical mechanisms that 
are important during infection (Kash et al., 2006a; Ludwig et al., 
2006). Although Mx1, RIG-I, CPSF30, 2′-5′ oligo (A) synthetase, 
and protein kinase R have clear roles in the host response to 
influenza viruses, many other host factors that affect resistance 
or susceptibility to these viruses probably remain to be dis-
covered. Recent innovative work reveals host factors that are 
involved specifically in influenza virus replication (Hao et al., 
2008). Priority should be given to identifying these factors, some 
of which may explain the elevated pathogenicity or the absence 
of transmission observed in certain populations.
Rapid Viral Evolution
The Moving Vaccine Target
The rapid evolution of the influenza A viruses continually com-
plicates the effective use of vaccines and therapies. Because 
these genomically unstable negative-strand RNA viruses 
change so rapidly, vaccine strains can quickly become out-
dated and the lengthy, labor-intensive, large-scale production 
of vaccines in eggs is problematic. The time lag between vac-
cine production and seasonal flu outbreaks (often 6 months or 
Table 1. Strategies for Vaccines and Antiviral Therapies
Vaccines Antiviral Therapies
Techniques
Inactivated vaccine Neuraminidase inhibitors
Subunit vaccine M2 ion channel blockers
Live attenuated vaccine Monoclonal antibodies
DNA-based vaccine Immunomodulatory therapy
Vector-based vaccine siRNAs
Virus like particles Sialic acid receptor cleavage/
sialidases
Inhibitors of virus-induced 
 signaling pathways
Inhibitors of viral polymerase
Challenges
Non-egg-based production Emergence of resistance
Targeting generation of virus-
specific CTLs
Timeframe of efficacy
Increasing immunogenicity and 
adjuvants
Stockpiling
Rapid production Accessibility and affordability
Dosage Dosage
Administration route Administration route
Immune  correlates of protection Duration of therapy
Combination therapy
more) can result in a mismatch between the vaccine and the 
circulating virus. During the 2007–2008 flu season, a mismatch 
in the seasonal influenza vaccine caused an increase in child-
hood deaths from influenza in the Northern Hemisphere. The 
outdated technology used to prepare vaccine strains and to 
mass-produce vaccines urgently requires modernizing (Table 
1). Much research has been focused on alternative vaccine 
production systems. The plasmid-based reverse genetics sys-
tem has been used to generate reference viruses for H5N1 vac-
cines. In addition, there have been promising advances in the 
development of vector, DNA, recombinant subunit, peptide-
based, and virus-like particle vaccines (Subbarao and Joseph, 
2007).
Lack of Immune Correlates of Vaccine Protection
How do vaccines mediate immune protection? Protection does 
not correlate with neutralizing antibodies after vaccination against 
H5N1 viruses, as it usually does after receipt of the seasonal 
influenza vaccine. Further, vaccines of different H5N1 clades and 
subtypes appear to offer crossprotection (Govorkova et al., 2006). 
Importantly, in the case of a pandemic, crossprotection may allow 
a minimum amount of vaccine to be used per person or may 
expand the pool of vaccine candidates. It is therefore essential 
to determine the mechanisms and factors required for crosspro-
tection, including the contributions of T cell-mediated immunity 
and serum and mucosal antibodies. Questions also remain about 
which vaccination methods (e.g., intact virus versus subunit vac-
cines; use of adjuvants; number, dose, and route of inoculations) 
will reduce the amount of vaccine needed (Leroux-Roels et al., 
2007). Research should also focus on resolving how age (par-
ticularly from the point of view of children and the elderly) affects 
vaccine efficacy and immune correlates of protection.
New strategies to induce immune protection against highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus must be explored. Vaccines 
based on proteins other than the surface glycoproteins, such 
as the matrix segment, have demonstrated some protec-
tive potential (Watanabe et al., 2007). Basic research into the 
mechanisms of the innate and adaptive immune responses to 
avian influenza virus will provide the cornerstone for the devel-
opment of optimally protective vaccines. Protection is currently 
gauged primarily by the production of neutralizing antibodies, 
although there is great variation in assay standards and, for 
certain viruses, poor correlation between the assay results and 
the level of protection. It is generally agreed that better immune 
correlates for testing vaccine efficacy are needed.
A long-standing question is whether a single vaccine could 
protect against influenza viruses of different subtypes. Rather 
than focusing on the production of neutralizing antibodies, immu-
nologists hope to generate a vaccine that activates virus-specific 
cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) directed toward epitopes con-
served among influenza virus subtypes. A subset of epitopes 
recognized by human CTLs is highly conserved among human 
and avian H5N1 influenza A viruses; these epitopes are on internal 
influenza proteins, which are less susceptible to antigenic varia-
tion (Wang et al., 2007). However, it remains to be determined how 
an activated T cell population could be maintained in the lungs 
without inducing autoimmunity. Crossreactive vaccines that acti-
vate CTLs would be a valuable tool for controlling avian influenza 
viruses with pandemic potential (Rimmelzwaan et al., 2007).Cell 136, February 6, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc. 407
Vaccine Use in Domestic Poultry
Vaccination to control the H5N1 virus in domestic poultry is 
controversial because of concerns that it may drive antigenic 
drift or mask the continued circulation of virus. However, the 
benefit of vaccinating poultry has been dramatically illustrated 
in Vietnam. By 2005, 90 humans in Vietnam had been infected 
with the avian influenza virus H5N1 and 39 had died. After wide-
spread vaccination of domestic poultry, infection of humans 
and domestic chickens ceased. The H5N1 virus re-emerged 
in humans and poultry in Vietnam in 2007 due to the difficulty 
of maintaining poultry vaccinations, effectively immunizing 
domestic ducks, and controlling poultry smuggling. A program 
requiring vaccination of all poultry entering Hong Kong was 
successful for 7 years but is now less effective because the 
vaccine needs to be updated.
Although poultry vaccination is an important tool for control 
of the H5N1 virus, the ultimate goal is eradication of this virus 
and cessation of vaccine use. Continued vaccination promotes 
endemic persistence of the H5N1 virus in domestic poultry 
and may mask the presence of highly pathogenic strains. The 
absence of global standards for the antigenic content of poul-
try vaccines is an unresolved problem, although the antigen 
dose required to induce protection and prevent virus spread 
in different breeds of domestic fowl is easily determined. More 
significantly, it remains unresolved whether standardized vac-
cination or vaccination of immunocompromised animals pro-
mote selection of more pathogenic variants of avian influenza 
virus. More information is needed about the immunobiology of 
avian species to determine the best use of poultry vaccines.
Antiviral Therapies
The anti-influenza drugs approved for clinical use are the 
neuraminidase inhibitors (orally administered oseltamivir trade 
name Tamiflu and inhaled zanamivir trade name Relenza) 
and inhibitors of the viral M2 matrix protein ion channels (the 
adamantanes, amantadine, and rimantadine). Several other 
neuraminidase inhibitors (peramivir; pyrrolidine derivative 
A315675; and long-acting R-118958 and FLUNET compounds) 
are under development. Oseltamivir is effective against many 
avian influenza virus strains in animal models, although an 
optimal treatment schedule may be required for highly viru-
lent viruses (Govorkova et al., 2007). Information about drug 
efficacy in humans is limited; treatment often starts late in the 
course of infection, and the dosage and duration of treatment 
are often suboptimal (Beigel et al., 2005).
The emergence of drug-resistant virus variants is one of the 
disadvantages of antiviral therapy. Most clade 1 H5N1 influenza 
viruses are now resistant to adamantanes (Hayden, 2006). Resis-
tance to the neuraminidase inhibitors appears to be less of a prob-
lem, although oseltamivir-resistant viruses with neuraminidase 
mutations (H274Y and N294S) have been isolated from patients 
during and before drug treatment (Le et al., 2005). Further, resis-
tant variants carrying either of these neuraminidase mutations 
may retain their high pathogenicity in mammalian species (Yen et 
al., 2007a). Emerging resistance to antivirals is of increasing con-
cern as H1N1 seasonal influenza viruses resistant to oseltamivir 
appeared in the 2007–2008 flu season (Lackenby et al., 2008) and 
have become prevalent in the 2008–2009 influenza season. Given 
that neuraminidase inhibitors are the most commonly prescribed 
for seasonal influenza and are being stockpiled in case of an 
influenza pandemic, it is imperative to understand how and why 
these drug-resistant influenza viruses are maintaining transmis-
sibility and virulence. Improved approaches to antiviral drug use 
may include development of new antivirals, using combinations of 
antivirals, or optimizing existing antiviral drug regimens (dosage, 
duration, route of administration).
Given increasing evidence that resistance to the conven-
tional antivirals emerges rapidly, there is an urgent need to 
identify new therapeutic targets. Viral polymerase activity 
may offer such a target, in view of the correlation between the 
lethality and rapid replication of certain avian influenza virus 
strains. Small-interfering RNAs against the genes encoding 
nucleoprotein or polymerase protein PA of the viral replica-
tion complex reduced virus replication and increased the sur-
vival of lethally challenged hosts (Tompkins et al., 2004). The 
screening of small inhibitory molecules using high-throughput 
viral replication assays will advance the field of anti-influenza 
therapy. Ribavirin and its analog viramidine, which inhibit virus-
encoded RNA polymerases, may also reduce the replication 
efficiency of H5N1 viruses. The sialidase fusion construct 
DAS181 (Fludase) was recently shown to cleave sialic acid 
receptors for both human and avian influenza viruses and to 
provide a potent anti-H5N1 therapeutic effect in infected mice 
(Belser et al., 2007).
In the search for protective agents, some researchers have 
focused on familiar anti-inflammatory drugs, including statins 
(Fedson, 2006). Neutralizing antibodies are also being pursued 
as a treatment strategy. Neutralizing anti-H5N1 human mono-
clonal antibodies provide effective prophylaxis and therapy in 
mice (Hanson et al., 2006; Simmons et al., 2007). Such neutral-
izing crossreactive antibodies or other immunotherapies are 
promising avenues for treating humans infected with the H5N1 
influenza virus.
Pandemic Preparedness
Influenza does not recognize man-made borders, and it is 
debatable whether any country should lay claim to strains of 
influenza virus isolated there. However, a country that shares 
its influenza virus isolates for global research is entitled to the 
benefits derived, especially if an emerging pathogen is killing 
its citizens. How such competing claims are to be balanced 
must be resolved by the World Health Organization. The core 
issues are ultimate ownership of the isolated viruses and asso-
ciated intellectual property, and the fair distribution of vaccines 
derived from those viruses. Such proprietary claims conflict 
with the global sharing of influenza viruses and their genomic 
information, vaccines, and antiviral drug sensitivity data 
required for optimal pandemic preparedness. These issues are 
under intensive review by international organizations seeking 
to ensure that developing countries will have access to vac-
cines and anti-influenza drugs derived from viruses isolated 
within their borders and will be informed of the distribution of 
those viruses and their derivatives.
Pandemic preparedness is an ongoing process that continu-
ally incorporates emerging information. Most countries have 
pandemic plans, but their effectiveness will depend on avail-408 Cell 136, February 6, 2009 ©2009 Elsevier Inc.ability of the expanding knowledge base to veterinary and pub-
lic health officials, the transfer of knowledge to industry, and 
ongoing communication with leaders in commerce, industry, 
and transportation.
There is concern that if an H5N1 pandemic does not occur, 
scientists will lose public credibility and pandemic planning 
will be supplanted by more pressing public health programs. 
Scientists have alerted the public to observations that call for 
special vigilance. However, an influenza pandemic is no more 
predictable than the human use of biological pathogens or 
chemical agents. Nations can help to ensure the sustainabil-
ity of their preparedness programs by establishing permanent 
pandemic planning staff positions in their health and security 
departments.
The stockpiling of antiviral agents is an important element 
of influenza pandemic planning, but the stability of the active 
ingredients, capsules, and inert carrier components must be 
monitored. Oseltamivir appears to be extremely stable (Monto 
et al., 2006). It would be unrealistic to consider replacement 
of stockpiled drugs, but their stable components could be 
recycled. Are pandemic planners making arrangements for the 
maintenance of these valuable national resources? Although 
the H5N1 avian influenza virus may never acquire full human 
pandemic potential, another influenza virus certainly will. Anti-
influenza drugs will remain our first line of defense.
Although it is currently impossible to predict which influenza 
virus will cause the next epidemic or pandemic, the pathogenic 
potential of these viruses can be anticipated more precisely 
with continued research and development in surveillance, diag-
nostics, and genomic studies of the virus and its key hosts.
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